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U.S. Moral Panics, Mexican Politics, and the Borderlands Origins of the War on 
Drugs 1950-1962 
 
On August 6 1956 the U.S. consul in Tijuana reported on the local reaction to a recent 
TV interview by the San Diego District Attorney. During the interview the District 
Attorney not only blamed Mexico for youth drug problems but also cast doubt on the 
Mexican authorities’ willingness to control narcotics traffic. He argued that the solution 
was the prohibition of U.S. youths from entering Mexico, the expansion of customs 
facilities at San Ysidro, and, if necessary, the temporary closure of the border. Only such 
a drastic measure, he claimed, would force the Mexican authorities take note. As the 
consul explained, national politicians ignored the slight. But, local politicians could not. 
The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) Governor of the newly-created state of 
Baja California Norte - Braulio Maldonado Sández- was already under pressure. On both 
sides of the border, newspapers and civil society organizations were accusing Maldonado 
of ordering the murder of the crusading Tijuana journalist, Manuel Acosta Meza, just two 
weeks earlier. The combination of factors had compelled the governor to act. During the 
first week of August, he had sacked the city police chief, announced that he was going to 
temporarily move the seat of government from Mexicali to Tijuana, and ordered an 
immediate cleanup of “vice, official bribery and other conditions reflecting adversely on 
Tijuana”.1  
 
This article examines California’s 1950s moral panic over drug use and its consequences 
in the bordering Mexican state of Baja California Norte. As the consul suggested, the 
1950s drug panic worked at two levels. In California both politicians and members of 
civil society developed a distinct set of arguments on how to stop the drug trade. These 
blamed U.S. drug use on Mexican supply, targeted the problem of Mexican corruption, 
and suggested manipulation of the border as a means to blackmail the Mexican 
authorities to crack down on traffickers. By the late 1960s, these arguments had become 
cornerstones of U.S., and particularly Republican, counter-narcotics policy. In 1969 
                                                        
1 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG)59, 1955-59, Report of 
Robert Hale, 6 Aug 1956. Baja California Norte had been made a state in 1953. Lawrence Douglas Taylor 
Hansen, “La transformación de Baja California en estado, 1931-1952,” Estudios Fronterizos, 1. 1 (2000). 
President Nixon even implemented the de facto shutting of the border in the form of 
Operation Intercept. But, California’s moral panic not only formed the basis for Nixon’s 
war on drugs, it also had serious contemporary effects south of the border. Here, again as 
the consul indicates, a complex interplay of exogenous and endogenous pressures 
emerged. Californian denouncements of Baja California’s corruption interwove and 
strengthened homegrown, Mexican hostility to the ruling PRI party. Such opposition took 
the form of a critical public sphere, combative civil society organizations, and by the late 
1950s, a powerful local branch of the opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Such 
groups, when combined with U.S. pressure, often forced the local authorities to enact 
periodic, well-publicized crackdowns on narcotics traffickers, corrupt cops, and low-level 
addicts. 
 
By examining the dynamics and effects of California’s 1950s moral panic, this article 
brings together, works off, and revises two distinct historical traditions. The first is the 
scholarship on the United States’ war on drugs. Though there is still debate over the 
origins, aims, rhythms, and geographies of the country’s anti-narcotics efforts, recent 
works have pinpointed the 1950s as a decisive point of inflection.2 During this decade, 
politicians, bureaucrats, and members of civil society not only established a new, and 
radically more punitive judicial framework, but also developed a distinct underlying 
“narrative” or “cultural script” to describe the drug trade and justify these legal changes.  
This narrative contained two elements – the African-American or Mexican-American 
drug pusher and the white, often female, drug user or victim. As Matthew Lassiter argues, 
this “pusher-victim” narrative emerged in the white suburbs of California and other 
southern states, and “fused the categories of race, gender, class, age and space in potent 
ways”. It would, he argues, form the basis for the inequalities of mass incarceration of the 
                                                        
2 E.g. Phil Nicholas y Andrew Churchill, “The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the States, and the Origins of 
Modern Drug Enforcement in the United States, 1950-1962”, Contemporary Drugs Problems 39 (2012): 
595-640; Matthew Lassiter, “Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America’s War on 
Drugs,” Journal of American History, 102.1 (June 2015): 126-40; Kathleen J. Frydl, The Drug Wars in 
America, 1940-1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Matthew D. Lassiter, “Pushers, 
Victims and the Lost Innocence of White Suburbia: California’s War on narcotics during the 1950s”, 
Journal of Urban History, 41.5 (2015): 787-807; Eric Schneider, Smack, Heroin and the American City 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 51-74. 
succeeding decades.3 This article builds on such findings, but pushes them further. Here, 
we argue that a third and crucial element of this narrative was the Mexican drug 
trafficker. This narrative underlay a series of suggested approaches to drug use, which 
also emerged during the 1950s. These stressed the idea that anti-narcotics effort should 
squeeze supply south of the border, that Mexican authorities were often unwilling to do 
this, and that manipulation of border traffic and trade could coerce them into action.  
 
The second is the research on Mexico’s own drug war. Early estimations of Mexico’s 
anti-narcotics efforts highlighted the United States’ pervasive influence. Scholars focused 
on a handful of moments when combinations of political pressure and economic 
blackmail pushed Mexico towards more hardline policies. They also emphasized the 
United States’ financial and tactical support for police and military anti-narcotics 
campaigns.4 Yet recently, a handful of scholars have started to reframe and nuance this 
tale of diplomatic dependency. Some have stressed Mexico’s homegrown counter-
narcotics rhetoric, which rested on endogenous prejudices against indigenous groups, 
female healers, and Chinese immigrants and could predate, outstrip, and shape America’s 
own anti-drug propaganda. Others have argued that exterior pressures may have inspired 
more aggressive narcotics policies, but they were also shaped and implemented according 
to more pressing domestic logics of institution-building, state-formation, and the 
                                                        
3 Schneider, Smack, 50; Lassiter, “Pushers”, 788; Lassiter, “Impossible Criminals. For the inequalities of 
mass incarceration see Michelle Alexander, The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of 
colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2010); Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters: 
Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History”, Journal of American 
History, 97.3 (2010): 703-34.  
4 The three key dates were 1940 (when a U.S. narcotics embargo shut down Mexico’s attempt to create a 
state narcotics monopoly), 1947-1948 (when Federal Bureau of Narcotics head Harry Anslinger used his 
standing at the United Nations to push Mexico into increasing its campaign against opium poppy growers 
and switching anti-narcotics operations from the Department of Health to the Federal Judicial Police), and 
1969 (when Operation Intercept forced Mexico into closer anti-drugs operations with the United States). 
William O. Walker, Drug Control in the Americas (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989); 
Luis Astorga Almanza, Drogas sin fronteras (Mexico City: Grijalvo, 2003); Mariana Flores Guevara, La 
alternativa mexicana al marco internacional de prohibición de drogas durante el Cardenismo, Unpubl. BA 
thesis, 2013; Ricardo Pérez Montfort, Tolerancia y prohibición: Aproximaciones a la historia social y 
cultural de las drogas en México 1840-1940, 162-8, 282–307; Froylan Enciso, “Los fracasos del chantaje: 
Regimen de Prohibicion de Drogas y Narcotráfico,” in Arturo Alvarado and Mónica Serrano, (eds.), Los 
grandes problemas de México: Seguridad Nacional y Seguridad Interior, (Mexico City: El Colegio de 
México, 2010), pp. 61-104 
repression of rural revolts.5 This article acknowledges such conclusions but also extends 
them down to the subnational level. At the border, localized moral panics – perhaps more 
than federal U.S. drug policy - could shape efforts to the south. Yet, even here domestic 
politics played a decisive role. In Baja California Norte, civil society organizations, 
newspapers, and opposition politicians fed, read, rejigged, and re-deployed U.S. 
denouncements in order to press for political change. And to survive, local PRI 
politicians had to act, firing corrupt cops, arresting major drug traffickers, and operating 
periodic moralization and clean up campaigns.  
 
Moral Panics and the Mexican Border 
 
During the 1950s, a series of moral panics over the use of heroin and marijuana beset 
California politics. Like most moral panics, they had some basis in observed reality, but 
were prone to hyperbole, allowed limited rational debate, and instead extended 
throughout a series of self-enforcing arenas.6 No doubt, the concept of the moral panic 
                                                        
5 For those that have emphasized endogenous pressures, see Perez Montfort, Tolerancia, 71-76; Elaine 
Carey, Women Drug Traffickers: Mules, Bosses, and Organized Crime (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 2015); Isaac Campos, Home grown: Marijuana and the origins of Mexico’s war on drugs 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Benjamin T. Smith, "Drug Policies in Mexico, 
1900-1980" in Beatriz C. Labate, Clancy Cavnar, & Thiago Rodrigues, (eds.), Drug Policies and the 
Politics of Drugs in Latin America,  (Cham: Switzerland, Springer International Publishing, 2016), 33-53; 
Isaac Campos, “A diplomatic failure: the Mexican role in the demise of the 1940 Reglamento Federal de 
Toxicomanías”, Third World Quarterly (2017). For those that have emphasized the instrumental use of 
drug policy, see Carlos Pérez Ricart, “U.S. pressure and Mexican anti-drugs efforts from 1940 to 1980: 
Importing the war on drugs?” in Wil Pansters, Benjamin T. Smith, Peter Watt, (eds.) Beyond the Drug War 
in Mexico: Human rights, the public sphere and justice (London: Routledge, 2017); Carlos Pérez Ricart, 
Las agencias antinarcóticas de los Estados Unidos y la construcción transnacional de la guerra contra las 
drogas en México (1938-1978), Unpubl. Ph.D diss, Freie Universität Berlin, 2016; Alex Aviña, “Group 
Blood: Drugs, Death Squads and the Dirty War Origins of the Mexican Narco-State,” Paper given at 
University of Warwick Conference on Drugs, Politics and Society: The Regional History of the Mexican 
Drug Trade, 19-20 June 2017; Adela Cedillo, “The Drugged Condor: The Transformation of Outlaw 
Peasants into Counterinsurgency Targets in Northwestern Mexico during the 1970s,” Paper given at 
University of Warwick Conference on Drugs, Politics and Society: The Regional History of the Mexican 
Drug Trade, 19-20 June 2017. 
6 Undoubtedly, there was drug dealing in Tijuana and some trafficking over the Mexico-California border. 
But, Californian estimates were way in excess of the traffic’s significance. The San Diego Customs Office 
reports from the early 1950s demonstrate a decline in cross-border traffic and a rise in the imports of Asian 
heroin. In fact, in 1952 the primary concern on the California-Mexico border was the smuggling of rare 
birds. NARA (Riverside), RG 36, Annual Reports of San Diego Customs Office, 1948-1954. Furthermore, 
contrary to assertions, marijuana rarely led to heroin addiction, most addicts were from minority not 
suburban white populations, most addicts were in their late twenties not their teens, and California only 
accounted for around 5 per cent of U.S. addicts. Schneider, Smack, 75-97. 
has certain analytical limits. 7  But, for our purpose,  the diachronic approach first 
employed by Stanley Cohen is useful.8 As in our case, it can account for multiple agents 
with diverse interests and motivations - media that search to boost profits, politicians 
focused on electoral gain, and civic groups intent on drawing moral boundaries. Despite 
their differences, they all presented themselves as “right-thinking people” and “socially 
accredited experts”; united they man ´the moral barricades´. At the same time, it can also 
explain how the framing practices of these groups coalesce and mutually reinforce one 
another to form moral panics. Together these spokespersons became the “primary 
definers” of the state drug “problem” and suggest both the nature of the debate and viable 
solutions. 9  Furthermore such moral panics are not just hot air; they ‘make things 
happen’.10 As they “are condensed political struggles’ around wider discourses of law, 
order and security, they have the capacity to trigger broader legal, institutional and 
political shifts.11 In the UK during the 1970s, the moral panic about ‘mugging’ fed off 
wider discourses about crime, race, and youth and then eased the way for a conservative 
backlash.12 During the 1980s, the moral panic over drugs, and particularly crack cocaine, 
helped usher in mass incarceration.13 
 
                                                        
7 Cary Bennet, “Drugs, moral panics and the dispositive”, in Journal of Sociology, first 
published September 6, 2017, https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1177/1440783317727877, 1-19; 
Amanda Rohloff & Sarah Wright, “Moral Panic and Social Theory. Beyond the Heuristic”, in Current 
Sociology, 58.3 (2010), 403-419; David Garland, “On the concept of moral panic”, in Crime, Media, 
Culture, 4.1 (2008), esp. 21-25; Matthew David, Amanda Rohlhoff, Julian Petley and Jason Hughes, “The 
idea of the moral panic-ten dimensions of dispute”, in Crime, Media , Culture 7.3 (2011), 215-228..   
8 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1972). This diachronic 
approach contrasts with  the attributional approach developed by Erich Goode, Nachman Ben-Yehuda, 
Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). See Chas Critcher, “Moral 
Panic Analysis: Past, Present and Future”, in Sociology Compass 2.4 (2008). Several studies attempt to 
connect Cohen’s original concept to recent theorizing, see e.g. Bennett, “Drugs, moral panics and the 
dispositive”, Rohloff & Wright, “Moral Panic and Social Theory”. 
9 Cohen, Folk Devils, p. 28; Hall et al, Policing the Crisis, pp. 57-60. Particularly relevant for our case is 
the influential study by Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, 
Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: MacMillan, 1978). For Mexico, see 
Wil G. Pansters, Política y Poder in Puebla. Formación y ocaso del cacicazgo avilacamachista, 1937-1987 
(Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998), 248-260.  
10 Garland, “On the concept of moral panic”, 15.   
11 See Stanley Cohen in the introduction to the third edition, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (London/New 
York: Routledge, 2011), xliv.  
12 Hall et al, Policing the Crisis. 
13 See his Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences (London: Sage, 2000). 
California’s 1950s panics relied on a cultural tradition of borderland permissiveness, but 
they were also new. Drugs – rather than sex or alcohol - now became the key biopolitical 
metaphor for exterior threats to the body politic.14 1950s moralizers blamed Mexican 
narcotics for California’s drug problem, created the specter of the border kingpin, 
denounced Mexican corruption, and started to promote the partial or wholesale closure of 
the border to force the Mexican authorities to stop narcotics at source. The panics had a 
distinct, traceable geography moving up from the border cities of San Diego and Calexico 
to Los Angeles and even San Francisco. Finally, they also had a distinct chronology, 
culminating in series of federal investigations and presidential inquiries in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s.  
 
Californian alarm over Mexican drug trafficking rested on both a culturally-constructed 
black legend of border permissiveness and a regular rhythm of one-off panics. 15  These 
went back to the 1910s, when they focused on the allure of Chinese opium dens and 
horse-racing. 16  During the following decade, they intertwined with anti-alcohol 
discourses and peaked with the uproar surround the so-called “Shame Suicides” of 1926. 
In the wake of the deaths, the Los Angeles Times called Tijuana the “Gomorrah of 
Mexican cities”.17 The end of prohibition and the Mexican decision to prohibit gambling 
dissipated the appeal of these border fright stories. But, they reappeared with force during 
the 1940s, and now focused on the mafia’s supposed influence and the growth of the 
                                                        
14 For biopolitics and narcotics, see Susan Marjorie Zieger, Inventing the Addict: Drugs, Race, and 
Sexuality in Nineteenth-century British and American Literature (Boston: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2008), 202-3, 233-42. 
15 There is extensive literature on this black legend. Humberto Felix Berumen, Tijuana la Horrible: Entre 
la historia y el mito (Mexicali: Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2003). For good examples of cultural works, 
which helped create the black legend, see Dashiell Hammett, The Golden Horseshoe and other stories 
(New York: Mysterious Press, 2016); Oakley Hall, Corpus of Joe Bailey (New York: Arbor House, 1953); 
Carroll Graham, Border Town (New York: Dell, 1952 edn); Raymond Chandler, The Chandler collection. 
2: the high window, The long good-bye, Playback (London: Pan Books, 1986); The Champ (directed by 
Franco Zeffirelli). 
16 Evening Tribune, 27 May 1916; San Diego Union, 30 May 1916; San Diego Union, 30 May 1916; Robin 
E. Robinson, Vice and Tourism in the US-Mexico Border: A Comparison of Three Communities in the Era 
of U.S. Prohibition. Unpubl. Ph.D, Arizona State University, 2002, 104. In 1920 the board of Temperance, 
Prohibition and Public Morals of the Methodist Church declared that Tijuana was “a mecca for prostitutes, 
booze sellers, gamblers and other American vermin”. John A Price, Tijuana: Urbanization in a Border 
Culture, (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 53. 
17 Vincent Cabeza de Vaca and Juan Cabeza de Vaca, “The "Shame Suicides" and Tijuana”, Journal of the 
Southwest, 43.4 (2001), 603-35. Robinson, Vice, 219-225, 219.  
prostitution industry. By the end of the decade, politicians and civil society organizations 
were highlighting the risk of venereal disease infecting U.S. marines and pushing the 
authorities to make Tijuana off limits to service men.18 
 
Like previous scares, the drug panic was rooted in the print media. Starting in the early 
1950s, borderland newspapers, like the San Diego Union, the Evening Tribune, the 
Calexico Chronicle, and the Coronado Eagle and Journal, ran an increasing number of 
stories on drug use, drug peddling, and drug trafficking. From 1940 to 1950, the San 
Diego Union published 1645 articles on narcotics. The following decade, the paper 
published nearly triple that amount. Over 30 percent of these articles made direct 
reference to Mexico and over a quarter mentioned the city of Tijuana.19 By the end of the 
decade, other California newspapers had started to replicate the San Diego Union’s 
emphasis. Between 1950 and 1958, just over 5 per cent of Los Angeles Times articles on 
drugs mentioned Mexico. Over the next two years, 13 per cent of such articles made the 
link. In comparison, other major U.S. newspapers failed to mark the connection. Only 3 
percent of New York Times and 2 percent of the Washington Post’s drugs articles 
referenced Mexico.20 
 
To establish the link between drug use and Mexico, newspapers used three approaches – 
sensationalist news stories, investigative reports, and campaigning editorials. Minor 
stories of drug busts or petty drug deals often stressed the source of the narcotics. On 18 
June 1953, the Coronado Eagle and Journal reported the arrest of a high school student 
with a couple of marijuana cigarettes. “Tijuana dope bust” read the rather misleading 
                                                        
18 For moral panic over the mafia, see J. L Albini, The American mafia: Genesis of a legend, (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971); Michael Woodiwiss and Dick Hobbs, “Organized Evil and the Atlantic 
Alliance: Moral Panics and the Rhetoric of Organized Crime Policing in America and Britain”, Journal of 
Criminology, 49.1 (2009), 106-28. San Diego Union, 12 Nov. 1944; NARA, RG59, 1945-49, Waldo Bailey 
to Secretary of State, 6 Oct. 1948. The San Diego Journal opined, “Tijuana emerges not as a colourful 
tourist lure with striped burros, fancy souvenirs, jai alai games, dog races and languorous Latin 
entertainment. Instead, it is seen clearly starkly as a source of human pollution, of utter depravity”. 
19 Between 1950 and 1960, there were 4722 articles in the San Diego Union that mentioned “narcotics”. 
1427 also mentioned Mexico. 1291 also mentioned Tijuana. San Diego Union, 01/01/1950-01/01/1960. 
20 Search for “narcotics” and “Mexico” in Los Angeles Times, 01/01/1950-01/01/1959; Los Angeles Times 
01/01/1959-01/01/1961. New York Times, 01/01/1950-01/01/1960; Washington Post, 01/01/1950-
01/01/1960.  
headline.21 When the Los Angeles police arrested a gang of professional roller skaters 
turned marijuana peddlers, the San Diego Union ignored the strange backstory and 
instead ran the tale under “5 Indicted in LA, Tijuana Dope Ring”.22 News reports on 
congressional hearings were also framed to emphasize the Mexican connection. In May 
1953, the Los Angeles Times headed its report on the Governor’s Commission on 
Organized Crime with “Mexico Blamed for Flood of Heroin coming into State”, 
neglected to mention the report’s mentions of European or Asian heroin, and instead 
cherry-picked alarmist accusations of a “bumper crop of Mexican opium” and the 
unsubstantiated rumor of a “top German scientist” processing the crop into narcotics.23  
 
Newspaper editors complemented these stories with hysterical investigative reports on 
drug use south of the border. The San Diego Union started the trend in early 1950 by 
publishing a series of pieces on drug gang vendettas in Tijuana. The reporter followed the 
career and bloody demise of the minor hoodlum, Antonio Piños Oros, and concluded that 
the city was “like the Chicago of Al Capone”.24 Two years later, the paper followed up 
the investigations with a series of articles by Gene Fuson, who posed as a drug addict to 
buy narcotics in Tijuana. Here, he explained how “hypes” (heroin addicts) and 
“weedheads” taught him the street lingo  (“a mixture of gangsterese and jivetalk”), the 
“mannerisms of a head”, and how to walk with the “peculiar shuffle of the Pachuco”. 
After picking up some tips, he visited “junky alley” where he tried to purchase some “H 
(heroin)” but was only offered “secas (marijuana)”. The next day Fuson’s search for “the 
action” was more successful. He went to an underground bar where teenagers drank and 
smoked or as they allegedly put it “lush[ed] for a double kick”, a sailor made love in a 
back room, and a bathroom attendant sold pornography. At first, he admitted “business 
was rotten and the atmosphere matched it; a compound of stale beer, cooking onions, 
stale smoke”. But by 2 am teenagers started to appear. Most were Mexican Americans 
“dressed in the Pachuco uniform of Levis, flying jackets with the collars turned up and 
“shag” haircuts”. Within an hour the place was full, a five piece jazz band had started to 
                                                        
21 Coronado Eagle and Journal, 18 Jun. 1953.  
22 San Diego Union, 12 May 1960. 
23 Los Angeles Times, 11 May 1953.  
24 San Diego Union, 28 Feb 1950. 
play and the bar had transformed into a, “shouting, struggling, jitterbugging mass of 
humanity”. The dancing was, the journalist concluded, fuelled by marijuana, which was 
sold by “the Duchess”, “a cadaverous [man] with acne scars and bushy hair” from the 
back of a closely guarded booth.25 
 
Seven years later, the Los Angeles Times ran a similar if even more influential series. In 
early 1959 the editors sent Gene Sherman to the border to investigate “the repeated 
stories of drug seizures that could be traced back to Mexico.” Here, he spent three months 
interviewing “dope peddlers, addicts, public officials, legislators and members of the 
underworld” before publishing the series in July. In one article he described how a Los 
Angeles teenager - “blonde, cute as a button” - had become addicted to “Mexican 
marijuana”. In another he visited Tijuana, where he was offered marijuana, “sex movies”, 
“a live show… two girls. In a private house. Just for you.” In subsequent articles, he 
interviewed a former heroin addict and peyote consumer who had seen “lots of amoeba 
and a big spider” and a 16-year-old San Diego girl who was not only “strikingly 
beautiful” but also crossed the border three times a day to get her fix.26 The combination 
of titillation, exploitation, and xenophobia was a hit; politicians lined up to congratulate 
the Times on its series, and Sherman won a Pulitzer for the pieces – grouped together 
under the title “A Mexican Monkey on Our Back”.27 
 
Finally, newspapers undergirded news stories and investigative reports with strongly 
worded editorials, which pressed politicians to act on their assertions of the links between 
drug use and Mexico. In the wake of Sherman’s articles, the Los Angeles Times was 
particularly pushy. On 12 July, the paper introduced the journalist’s series with the 
editorial “Where Narcotics Come From”. Though the bulk of the reporting was actually 
done in the United States, the editors concluded that the main “take home” from the 
articles “besides the grisliness of addiction and the depravity of the traffic” was “that 
Mexico is the source of most of South California’s illicit narcotics.” Less than a week 
                                                        
25 San Diego Union, 2 Feb. 1952; San Diego Union, 3 Feb. 1952. See other articles in series by Fuson in 
San Diego Union, 27 Jan. 1952-6 Feb. 1952.  
26 Los Angeles Times, 12-17 Jul. 1959.  
27 Los Angeles Times, 12 Mar. 1960.  
later, the paper again urged politicians to take note of the articles, temporarily close the 
border, and “help make the boundary of the U.S. and Mexican Californias the dividing 
line between respectable prosperity and squalid depravity”.28 
 
Outside print journalism, the mass media’s depiction of the links between drug use and 
Mexico was more muted. Federal control of film and TV was more developed. Harry 
Anslinger disapproved of onscreen portrayals of drug use and at least one TV 
documentary “on the easy purchase of drugs in Tijuana” was dropped at the last minute 
“because of the Good Neighbor Policy”.29 But, gradually a range of different genres 
started to investigate the border drug trade. Between 1949 and 1950, studios released 
three noir flicks, Borderline, Federal Man, and Johnny Stool Pigeon, which all concerned 
“real life” investigations into narcotics smuggling at the U.S.-Mexico border. Seven years 
later, they put out The Tijuana Story, which concerned the death of Tijuana journalist, 
Meza Acosta, and insinuated the responsibility of the Baja California Norte governor. 
The film was so incendiary, it was banned in Mexico. Finally, in the late 1950s there was 
a rash of films on the Mexican drug trade, ranging from trashy and xenophobic teen 
exploitation films like Eighteen and Anxious (1957) and The Young Captives (1959) to 
more subtly subversive movies like Touch of Evil (1958) where the hero was a Mexican 
drugs cop (admitted played by Charlton Heston) married to a blonde, American woman.30 
By the late 1950s TV stations had also started to show depictions of the trade. In 
November 1959 KRCA showed three telecasts entitled “Heroin” about the “problem of 
narcotics in Mexico and California”. In the most explosive episode an undercover 
reporter purchased heroin on a Tijuana street and interviewed a former Mexican cop, who 
explained the ways that the authorities protected the trade.31  
 
As we shall see, the media’s focus on border drug trafficking resonated with groups on 
both sides of the border. In Mexico, journalists and citizens both fed and fed off the 
                                                        
28 Los Angeles Times, 12 Jul. 1959; Los Angeles Times, 19 Jul. 1959. 
29 Desert Sun, 20 Dec. 1958 
30 Borderline (1950); Federal Man (1950); Johnny Stool Pigeon (1949); Tijuana Story (1957); Eighteen 
and Anxious (1957); The Young Captives (1959); Touch of Evil (1958). 
31 Desert Sun, 14 Nov. 1959; Los Angeles Times, 15 Nov. 1959 
accusations. In California, it attracted two groups in particular. The first were moralizing 
civil society organizations.32 These included women’s organizations, like the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs and the Women’s Civic League, business organizations 
like the Rotary Club, the Lions, and various Chambers of Commerce, parents groups, and 
veterans’ organizations. Together these groups wrote complaints to politicians and 
newspapers, thanked papers for their alarmist coverage, held public meetings to highlight 
the trend, and collected vast numbers of signatures for petitions designed to force 
politicians to crack down on the traffic.33 San Diego’s Junior Chamber of Commerce 
even organized its own ad hoc investigation of the Tijuana vice scene. In May 1957 a 
handful of members crossed the border, purchased pornographic literature, and reported 
that, “narcotics in the form of marijuana, heroin and other opium derivatives are easily 
available to any juvenile”.34  
 
The second were low-level elected officials from border communities. These comprised 
law enforcement officials, like the San Diego sheriff Bert Strand, school board heads like 
Richard Barbour, who declared Tijuana “probably the most sinful city in the Western 
world”, and judicial appointees, like the San Diego District Attorney, Don Keller, and the 
Superior Court judge “Hanging John Hewicker” aka “Blood John” who laughed 
uproariously when his fellow judges presented him with a miniature guillotine on his 
retirement.35 These figures realized that election depended on a hardline law and order 
stance and that the easiest target was Mexico. In 1952 the mayor of Tijuana wryly 
observed that, “every time there are elections in San Diego, most of the candidates try to 
                                                        
32 For the rise of the suburban right and these groups, see Lisa McGirr, Suburban warriors: The origins of 
the new American Right (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2001); Michelle Nickerson, Mothers of 
conservatism: Women and the postwar right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
33 San Diego Union, 29 Jul. 1958; Los Angeles Times, 4 Mar. 1952; San Diego Union, 22 Dec. 1952; Los 
Angeles Times, 21 Jul. 1960; San Diego Union, 10 Feb. 1950; San Diego Union, 12 Feb. 1952; Juvenile 
Delinquency, hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Committee on 
the Judiciary US Senate, Pursuant to S. Res 89 Investigation of Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 
September 24, 27 and October 4, 5 1954, (Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 70. They 
even wrote to the Mexican president. Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (ARC), 
422/1, Kenneth Beam to President Ruiz Cortines, 20 Feb. 1953; AGN, Adolfo López Mateos (ALM), 
422/2, Patricia Reveles to President López Mateos, 6 Apr. 1960; AGN, ALM, 422/3 Marian A. Herzer to 
President López Mateos, 6 Jun. 1960. 
34 San Diego Union, 9 May 1957. 
35 San Diego Union, 12 Dec 1956; Noticias, 20 Jul. 1958; San Diego Union, 6 Dec. 1960; San Diego 
Union, 28 Feb. 1952; San Diego Union, 28 Apr. 1955; San Diego Union, 20 Nov. 1956; San Diego and 
Point Magazine, February 1957, p. 33 
use the city of Tijuana and the charges of drug smuggling for campaign material in their 
favor”.36 Two years later a former soldier and FBI agent, Hank Adams, - dubbed (quite 
possibly by himself) “The One Man Army of Tulagi” - proved the mayor’s point. Not 
content with boasting that he had killed ten Japanese soldiers in World War II, he tried to 
become San Diego County sheriff on the platform that he would “sort out the problem of 
kids going to Tijuana for drugs”. These same figures also made frequent public 
declarations, which blamed crime and drug use on the proximity to the Mexican border. 
(Hewicker, for example, claimed that there were only two reasons to go to Tijuana - “to 
get shot or to buy narcotics”).37 And, as we shall see, they often used their very limited 
authority to try blackmail Mexican authorities into action.  
Together, the accounts of journalists, civil society spokespersons and politicians fed into 
large-scale public investigations. Some were local grand jury trials. In June 1951 there 
was a San Diego grand jury on marijuana use among local youths; two years later a Los 
Angeles grand jury looked into a Tijuana-based drug ring, which exchanged stolen cars 
for narcotics; and in 1960 Imperial County held its own inquiry into local drug dealing 
and concluded that “four big dealers in Mexicali supplied almost all the narcotics passing 
through Imperial Valley”.38 Others were state-level studies, like the Special Crime Study 
Commission of the early 1950s, and the 1960’s Special Study Commission on 
Narcotics.39 Others still were federal inquiries, like the hearings on juvenile delinquency 
held in cities throughout the southwest in 1955 and again in 1959.40 The federal hearings 
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in particular were vast, public set pieces, which gave California newspapermen, 
politicians, civil leaders, and bureaucrats space and opportunity to stake out their 
assessment of the border drug problem and the possible solutions. These assessments 
were, in turn, refracted and amplified through a tub-thumping, local press. As the 
example suggests, the media, the principal spokespersons or “primary definers,” and the 
institutions, which fed and developed California’s drug panic, were intimately related. 
Sheriffs pushed border stoppages at Women’s Clubs meetings; district attorneys publicly 
praised newspaper investigations; and reporters performed star turns at senate hearings. 
Such a tight skein offered little space for debate or nuance.  
 
Instead, California’s anti-narcotics crusaders stressed four, relatively consistent, claims. 
First, they argued that the principal reason for Californian drug use was the state’s 
proximity to the Mexican border. On the one hand, this aided smuggling. Officials 
repeatedly claimed that all the marijuana and 50 to 75 per cent per cent of the heroin in 
California was trafficked in from Mexico.41 As early as 1951, the San Diego Attorney 
General called Tijuana, a “nest of marijuana and heroin”.42 By the end of the decade, 
such opinions were even more commonplace. A 1959 Los Angeles Times editorial on the 
provenance of local narcotics was even read out at the subsequent subcommittee on 
juvenile delinquency. “Like the cancer it is, the illicit narcotics problem spreads with 
deadly insidious certainty from its origin. Nationally, the origin may be Communist 
China, Europe, or the Middle East. In Los Angeles, it primarily is Mexico”. Visual aids 
underpinned these assertions. In the same hearing one witness even produced bundles of 
marijuana wrapped in the Sol de Sinaloa to prove his point. On the other hand, if state 
sources were “dry”, young Californians could acquire drugs by means of a quick trip over 
the border. “It is no more difficult to buy opium and heroin in Mexican border towns than 
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it is to purchase a pair of boots”.43 When Fuson, the San Diego Union journalist, posed as 
a “head” to score drugs in Tijuana he found that the situation  “was literally running 
rampant”. In one brothel alone he had seen over 200 juveniles involved in a “marijuana 
party”. The attractions of border heroin were even more insidious. Again, according to 
Fuson, taxi drivers offered to drive curious Americans to so-called “shooting galleries” 
located in shacks on the edge of the city where “doctors” or “practical nurses” would help 
the out-of-towners hit their first vein.44  
 
Second, these activists started to focus to their fears on the carefully-crafted image of the 
border kingpin. Candidates to play the role were numerous. Contrary to Californian 
assertions, drug trafficking in northern Mexico was, in fact, relatively horizontal and 
organized by at least a dozen small, often family-run operations.45  During the early 
1950s, southern Californian newspapers put forward a variety of contenders including 
José Méndez García (shot in 1951), Telesforo Parra López, (forced underground after the 
break up of the cars-for-drugs ring in 1953), and perhaps best of all governor 
Maldonado’s nephew, Solomon Rodrigo Sández Jr. (sentenced to seven years in 1955).46 
But during the 1955 juvenile delinquency hearings, Californian politicians settled on the 
figure of Miguel “Big Mike” Barragán Bautista. During the November hearings in Los 
Angeles, “Big Mike” dominated proceedings. Heroin addicts testified that they often 
bought their personal supplies at “Big Mike’s” small four-room residence in Colonia 
Independencia. (“If Mike deals with you, there is no finger.”) The head of San Diego 
customs confirmed that he had known “Big Mike” for years and another narcotics cop 
claimed that “Big Mike’s” heroin network spread as far as east Texas. Such influence had 
bought the trafficker “a ranch”, “racing dogs”, “the largest house of ill repute in Tijuana” 
(where his wife was the madam and also principal heroin dealer), and a taxi rank. Over 
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the next decade, “Big Mike” would reappear regularly in local newspapers and judicial 
hearings.47  
 
Third, California’s anti-narcotics moralizers concluded that the principal reason for the 
availability of narcotics was not U.S. demand but Mexican corruption. The newspaper 
reporters were particularly outspoken. Fuson suggested that the Mexican government 
needed to “pay more than lip service to its narcotics laws” and Sherman wrote that 
Tijuana was a “vile, vice strewn sump hole of civilization pandering to the lowest 
impulses of humanity riddled with graft and corruption” and called the claims that 
Mexicans were attempting to quash the trade “laughable”.48 Summarizing the thinking 
quite succinctly, a follow-up editorial concluded that the “There is no reason why 
northern good living should not overflow the frontier, no reason except the tolerance on 
the southern side of the most inhuman of human indecencies”.49 But, increasingly law 
enforcement officials also presented similar views. Keller, the San Diego District 
Attorney, repeatedly questioned the willingness of the Mexican authorities to arrest drug 
traffickers. And, weaving together the figure of the border kingpin and assumptions of 
Mexican corruption, LA Police Chief Parker claimed that the Tijuana police’s inability to 
arrest “Big Mike” demonstrated their “attitude of great indulgence” towards the trade.50  
 
Fourth, the California authorities viewed the solution to these problems as the 
manipulation of US-Mexican border traffic. Initially, the measure was preventative; 
officials proposed cutting youth drug use by closing the border to young American 
tourists. In 1951 the head of the San Diego Grand Jury suggested the move, which was 
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quickly applauded by the San Diego District Attorney. 51  A year later, the Customs 
Bureau agreed to register unaccompanied youngsters crossing the border.52 Soon after, 
the San Diego Sherriff took matters into his own hands and ran a series of police 
roadblocks to check on young tourists. On the U.S. side, the measure was extremely 
popular, especially with concerned parents and over the next decade San Diego’s police 
officials periodically enforced roadblocks or youth curfews to appeal to these voters.53  
 
Yet sporadic border slowdowns also had another effect. On some days, traffic at the 
border backed up for over three miles. In Tijuana in early 1952, tourism declined and 
attendance at the Sunday horse races dropped markedly.54 As the U.S. consul observed, 
Mexicans considered the move as the “equivalent of closing the border”.55 These effects 
south of the border turned the strategy from a stopgap measure designed to protect 
vulnerable Californians to a means to force Mexican officials to clamp down on the 
border drug trade. Prevention turned to extortion. Again, journalists pushed the move. As 
early as 1955, San Diego Union journalist, Fuson, voiced the idea, announcing at the 
juvenile delinquency subcommittee a “means of blackjacking the Mexican Government 
into doing something about this narcotics situation.” “If that gate were slammed 
tomorrow morning and somebody said that they would open it when the narcotics 
business was stopped you would not find a narcotics peddler within 400 miles of that 
border by Sunday morning”.56 By the end of the decade, it had become a tenet of law-
and-order thinking. Elected officials suggested, “closing the border” to make the 
Mexicans “take narcotics seriously” and LA Police Chief Parker claimed, “All you have 
to do is close the border. They [the Mexicans]’ ll come round, they need the money. If 
that is the only way you can get anything done then maybe that’s the solution.”57  
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 Despite the uniform patina of the Californian claims, some patterns did emerge. As the 
figures for news stories indicate, the border panic started at the border in Imperial and 
San Diego counties. But, by the mid 1950s, it had spread northwards to the Los Angeles 
suburbs of Orange County and Riverside and then into Los Angeles itself. To put it 
another way measures voiced by the San Diego sheriff in 1952 were being echoed by the 
LA police chief less than a decade later.58 In fact, by 1962, another subcommittee on 
juvenile delinquency was calling in police officers from as far north as Ventura county to 
comment on the border drug trade.59 As the waves of panic spread, they increased in both 
intensity and political importance. By the end of the decade, federal congressmen were 
calling on both the U.S. State Department, and the FBN to take more forceful measures 
against Mexico. Such high-profile concern shifted the focus to Washington, where the 
same politicians forced President Eisenhower to hold an Interdepartmental Committee on 
Narcotics in 1960.60 His successor, President Kennedy, followed up the meeting with the 
White House Conference on Narcotics three years later. The Mexican drug trade had 
rarely been the subject of national debate and, contrary to the Californian claims, it still 
accounted for a small percentage of total U.S. narcotics imports.61 But, by the early 
1960s, the Californian panic had pushed border smuggling to the forefront of U.S. drug 
policy and U.S. pressure on the Mexican authorities to clamp down on the trade became 
increasingly firm, culminating in Nixon’s border closure in 1969.  
 
Baja California Norte Politics and the Mexican Reaction 
 
California’s moral panic helped generate the national rollout of a more aggressive foreign 
anti-narcotics policy. But the panic also had more immediate effects south of the border. 
At the national level, reaction was muted. The federal authorities had the support of the 
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national press and the backing of the U.S. State Department and the FBN. At the state 
level, however, the effects were much more drastic. In Baja California, politics were open 
and combative. On one side was a weak branch of the ruling party (the PRI), which 
controlled the state through an elected governor - Braulio Maldonado (1953-1959) - and 
elected councils in Tijuana, Ensenada, Mexicali, and Tecate. On the other side were 
powerful civil society organizations, a belligerent, and popular local press, and by the end 
of the decade a powerful opposition party, the PAN. During the decade, these groups not 
only fed the California panic by passing news of scandals, poor policing, and general 
impunity northwards, but also used the subsequent U.S. pressure to push the governor to 
sack unpopular police chiefs, clean up residential zones, and curb the most obvious 
examples of corruption.  
 
Federal Mexican reaction to the constant stream of accusations was denial. Government 
representatives rejected the existence of a large-scale drug trade, and pointed out that the 
problem of youth delinquency was a U.S. not a Mexican one. In May 1953, for example, 
the Mexican consul in Los Angeles publically rebuffed the “false accusations” of the 
California Crime Commission, asking for any proof of the claims of mysterious German 
chemists, official collusion with drug traffickers, or the open street sale of heroin.62 Such 
rebuffals were relatively easy. The Mexican authorities had the support of the U.S. State 
Department, which viewed the country as an important barrier to communist influence 
and was often willing to testify to the cooperation between the two countries.63 They 
were also backed by Harry Anslinger and the FBN. Anslinger like the State Department 
viewed the drug war through a Cold War lens, was close to Mexico’s anti-narcotics 
officials, and was more concerned with stressing (admittedly imagined) threats of heroin 
from communist China. As a result, FBN estimates of the Mexican contribution to the 
U.S. drug problem remained extremely low throughout the 1950s.64 Furthermore, in the 
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national capital, where most important politicians and opinion makers were based, 
narcotics were simply not an issue. Drug use was relatively low and the highbrow 
broadsheets either ignored border smuggling or reiterated official denials. In reaction to 
the accusations of Californian congressmen, a 1960 Excélsior editorial stated that it was 
“a common practice to heap infamy on Mexico as a principal market for drugs”. The 
paper called such claims “a joke in bad taste”; Mexico had very few users. The problem, 
the paper stated, was in the United States where the authorities were unable to control 
their addicts.65  
 
In contrast, in Baja California Norte, such denials were much tougher to make. At one 
level, the effects of the drug trade were more obvious. U.S. youths did smoke marijuana 
in clubs, buy hits from street heroin dealers, and occasionally overdose in Tijuana 
hotels.66 Yet the visibility of the drug trade only partially accounts for the local reaction. 
Drug production and trafficking were relatively open in other regions of Mexico, yet 
local reactions were as muted as those of the national government. 67  Where Baja 
California really differed was in the local government’s inability to control the perception 
of the trade. On the one hand, the underlying support for the ruling party – the PRI – was 
weak. Baja California Norte had only been made an autonomous state in 1953.68 The 
architecture of the ruling party was still under construction. Even the governor famously 
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described his administration as “harmoniously structured chaos”. 69  The traditional 
supports, like the peasant federations and workers unions, were small, underpowered, or 
too close to the communist party for membership. The popular sector, which was 
designed to bring together urban voters, barely existed. As so many inhabitants to the 
cities of Tijuana and Mexicali were relatively new, the sector lacked the established 
networks, which it relied on in other cities.70 Finally, official control of the print media 
was also extremely fragile. During the same 1959 elections, the PRI only managed 
content in two newspapers. Even these were ineffective. They barely sold 500 copies; 
many were openly burned and those that were not were bought in bulk, defaced with the 
initials of the opposing party, and repurposed as anti-PRI propaganda.71  
 
In contrast, opposition to the ruling party was relatively strong. Tijuana, in particular, 
contained a raft of independent civil society organizations from business groups like the 
Lions and Rotary Clubs, through cross-class single-issue organizations, like the tax 
pressure group, the Union of Contributors and Users of Public Services of Tijuana (Unión 
de Contribuyentes y Usuarios de Servicios Publicos de Tijuana) to working class groups 
like the mutual societies of the barrios of La Libertad and Zaragoza.72 These civil society 
groups were kept informed by a vibrant and popular public sphere.73 The most strident 
was Manuel Acosta Meza’s El Imparcial. During the 1950s, his newspaper became 
increasingly critical of the state governor, Braulio Maldonado, who - he claimed - openly 
abetted local drug traffickers, gangsters, and other criminals. In 1956, Acosta even 
threatened to publish a list of all the public administrators who were taking money from 
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the owners of illegal brothels or what he termed “the Union of Pimps”. The threat 
probably got Acosta killed.74 But, other combative editors and journalists quickly took his 
place, including the editor of Noticias, Jose Garduño Bustamante, who was consistently 
critical of Maldonado’s government, always kept an eye on the window, “to avoid an 
attack on his life”, and was framed at least twice for narcotics trafficking.75  
 
Finally, these groups started to come together under the umbrella of the opposition PAN. 
Traditionally the PAN had been the party of fervent middle-class Catholics. 76 But, at 
particular conjunctures it was able to take advantage of the combination of PRI weakness, 
independent civil society organizations, and relatively open public spheres to make 
serious inroads in a handful of northern cities, including Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez.77 In 
1959, the newly invigorated opposition party put forward its own gubernatorial 
candidate, Salvador Rosas Magallón, a civic-minded lawyer who had previously worked 
on behalf of squatter communities. The PRI candidate won but at a cost. It was - as 
Ortega commented - “democracy” but “a democracy directed by machine guns”.78  
 
Baja California Norte’s opposition groups attacked the region’s drug trade for two 
reasons. In part, they shared the moral opprobrium of U.S. citizens groups. As early as 
1951, the U.S. consul admitted that the city had a “very substantial element, supported 
and represented by the Mexican official family and civic groups” that was “alive to the 
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situation [of youth drug taking]” and was “anxious to bring about corrective measures”.79 
But, in part it was local politics. What better way to attack a political opponent than to 
feed the criticisms of a supposedly neutral neighbor?  
 
The groups’ motivations were reflected in the two strategies used to confront the trade. 
On the one hand, they both nourished and amplified California’s own moral panic. Here, 
Acosta was key. As well as running El Imparcial, he worked as a United Press stringer 
and the San Diego Union’s Tijuana correspondent. In these roles he wrote dozens of 
denunciations of government complicity in both the prostitution and the drug trade.80 He 
also became Fuson’s principal border whistleblower. When the journalist spoke at the 
subcommittee hearings he admitted that an unnamed source had passed him “a list of 
names and the type of operation and the racket they ran and how it works”. This same 
“confidential source” explained that one of the most profitable “rackets” was protecting 
drug traffickers.81 Acosta was rather unusual and perhaps the information he passed to 
Fuson helped seal his own death. But other groups also abetted the California activists. 
Civil society organizations, like the Chamber of Commerce and the Lions club, often met 
their American counterparts, denounced the state of the border, and promised to pressure 
their governor to clean it up. 82  Opposition groups also repeated U.S. accusations to 
critique their own officials. Again, this was most obvious in the press. Garduño’s 
Noticias frequently reprinted the claims of San Diego policemen, judges, and moralizing 
parents boards. Furthermore, like Acosta he blamed drug trafficking on the state 
authorities. After reprinting the San Diego sheriff’s claims that in just two hours on the 
Tijuana strip he had been offered “marijuana, heroin, immoral films and pornographic 
literature”, he ridiculed the state governor’s claims to be clearing up the city. “Nothing 
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changes… the fact is that the government has never worried about doing a true clean up 
of Tijuana”.83  
 
On the other hand, Mexicans also shaped their own narrative surrounding the trade. As 
the examples above suggest, this was explicitly political and focused on the local 
authorities thought to be protecting the racket. The drug trade became a crucial indicator 
of political corruption. Everyday accusations centered on the Tijuana police. In July 
1958, for example, Garduño’s Noticias ran ample coverage of the investigation into 
claims that the Mexican secret service (the Dirección Federal de Seguridad or DFS) and 
the federal narcotics police had teamed up to traffic confiscated drugs over the border 
into San Diego. 84  In the same year, the Union of Contributors and Users of Public 
Services of Tijuana gathered thousands of signatures to demand the governor to “clean up 
the drug business”, reorganize the city’s police force, and up vigilance on the main 
street.85  But, other accusations touched on higher officials.86 In June 1956 El Imparcial 
ran a series of interviews with a local heroin addict, Juan García. García claimed that the 
municipal authorities ran the prison’s lucrative heroin racket, forcing pushers to take a 
certain amount of narcotics in return for a daily payment of 500 pesos. Such was the 
pressure to pay the bribe, the pushers held down new prisoners, injected them with the 
drug, and forced them into addiction.87  
 
Perhaps the most cogent statement of such systemic corruption was the 1956 exposé, 
Tijuana, La Ciudad Maldita. Carlos G. Ortega, one of Acosta’s journalists on El 
Imparcial, wrote the book in response to his boss’s murder. In it, he explicitly linked the 
prostitution racket and the drugs trade. They were, he argued, part of the same officially 
sanctioned business. Traffickers moved drugs and vulnerable young women from 
Mexico’s western sierra up to the border city.88 Women and drugs were then distributed 
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around the city’s bars, brothels, and billiards halls. A section of the narcotics was also set 
aside for sale in the local prison. Taxi drivers advertised both products to visiting 
Americans for a cut of the sale. All those involved paid the authorities in return for 
impunity. Payoffs went to policemen, municipal functionaries, local politicians, and the 
governor and his family. In the explosive final section of the book, Ortega started to 
name names, claiming that Braulio Maldonado’s nephews, Salomon, Loreto and 
Melquiades Sández as well as the local congressman, Jose Ricardi Tirado, owned some 
of the most notorious local bars-cum-brothels, and were in charge of collecting 
contributions from the others.89  
 
From 1956 onwards, the PAN began to weaponise such denunciations, using them to 
attack the governor. The PAN leader, Rosas Magallón, was the first to republish Ortega’s 
list of names in the party daily, El Debate. 90  By 1958, the accusations of official 
complicity in the trade had become a stock indictment of the ruling party. As competition 
for the gubernatorial election hotted up, the PAN published a petition demanding 
Maldonado’s resignation. The accusations were numerous and included suppressing the 
free press, running a group of armed thugs, robbing the state treasury and throwing poor 
urban squatters off valuable city-center land. But, they also included running the local 
prostitution and drug rackets “in conjunction with close members of his family”.91  
 
The state administration could have rode out either external denunciations or internal 
pressures with the support of the federal government and certain high U.S. profile figures 
in the United States. But the combination was too much. Governor Maldonado and his 
successor, Eligio Esquivel Méndez, were repeatedly forced to enact periodic public 
crackdowns on the drug trade. Some took the form of the mass arrest of small-time 
dealers. These took the form of raids or razzias of popular drug selling spaces such as 
billiards, brothels, and cantinas. For example, in September 1957 two days after Judge 
Hewicker had challenged the U.S. ambassador in Mexico City to visit Tijuana and had 
followed it up with one of his periodic demands to shut the border, the Baja California 
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Norte police made 83 arrests of “crooks and vagrants” throughout the city. 92  The 
following year, there was an almost exact replay. On 15 August, Hewicker urged the 
“threat of federal closing or at least tightening of the international border”. Two days 
later, the Tijuana government imposed a curfew on under-18 year olds and arrested 79 
youths who had broken the new law.93  
 
But the most regular site of these raids – and the place guaranteed to contain copious 
narcotics – was the local prisons. In the weeks following the Acosta Meza murder, there 
were repeated raids of known drug dealers houses and at least three major searches of the 
mens’ and women’s prisons. Here they found “large amounts of marijuana, heroin, 
droppers, needles, and spoons”.94 These were not chance searches, they were planned 
swoops ordered from on high. In March 1957, the chief of the Tijuana police reported to 
Governor Maldonado that in the six months following Acosta Meza’s death, he “had been 
following strict orders relative to combatting narcotics” and “performing razzias on 
known drug addicts”.95 The raids were designed to impress both local and international 
audiences. The detainees and their drug paraphernalia were paraded in front of the 
cameras; press releases on the prisoners were fed to local newspapers; and amounts of 
narcotics were totaled up and reported in formal conferences every few months.96 Even 
these were calibrated to make an impact. On 26 March 1956 - the day President 
Eisenhower was meeting his Mexican counterpart, President Ruiz Cortines, at White 
Sulphur Springs - the Baja California Norte attorney general gave an interview with 
national and international pressmen on the recent counter-narcotics campaign. In the last 
four months (or since the embarrassing November 1955 juvenile delinquency hearings) 
the campaign had achieved “magnificent results” and arrested 52 dealers and captured 
273 grams of heroin, 2 kilos of opium, 146 grams of morphine, 347 kilos of marihuana, 
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and 3827 marijuana cigarettes.97 Finally, starting in late 1957, the Mexican authorities 
publicized these results with official burnings. These were major public events attended 
by representatives of the health department, the police, and the attorney general. They 
were held in a large square by the Monumento a la Madre, just a few blocks from the 
border.98  Concerned Californians could probably smell the smoke.  
 
Raids had the advantage of mass arrests and bulk seizures. But, when the pressure was 
really on, the state authorities also went after some of the more significant traffickers. In 
the wake of the Acosta Meza murder, Tijuana police arrested Dominga Urias Iriarte aka 
“La Minga”, who was a major broker between Sinaloa growers and the border sellers, 
raided Mike Barragán’s ranch, and arrested a handful of other major traffickers in 
conjunction with the FBN. These included Barragán’s lieutenant, Antonio Gastelum.99 
After the 1959 elections and another embarrassing juvenile delinquency hearing, 
apprehension rose again. In the next six months, Mexican officials arrested two of 
Barragan’s lieutenants, Antonio Gastelum (again) and Urban Siqueiros, the 1953 cars-
for-drugs mastermind, Telesforo Parra López, and two other key traffickers, Patricio 
Becerra Ortíz and Cruz Macias.100 Barragán himself was a tougher proposition. He had 
top lawyers, was extremely careful to never personally touch the narcotics, and even shot 
a man who brought drugs to his ranch. As a result, repeated raids of his properties came 
up with nothing.101  
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Finally, the state authorities also enacted regular purges of the local police forces. This 
was not as easy as it might seem. By the 1950s, regional governments relied on numerous 
overlapping forces, including federal groups like the Federal Narcotics Police, the 
Federal Judicial Police, and the Dirección Federal de Seguridad and local units like the 
state judicial police, the municipal police, the state secret service, and the “juvenile 
police”. At the same time, these were “aided” by numerous informal policemen. These 
came from the ranks of loyal unions and received no official recognition or salary. 
Instead they were given a charola or badge and instructed to get revenue through 
demanding bribes in return for protection.102 From 1956 onwards, the mass sacking of the 
police was a regular occurrence. In the two months following Acosta Meza’s death, the 
state government not only fired the Tijuana police chief but also moved the state judicial 
police around the state’s four municipalities. Within a month, the state attorney general 
arrived in the city, sacked the new force, and hired another group. Their names were 
published in the city newspapers so “other elements do not usurp their role”.103 Within 
just over a year, however, the problem had returned. Civil organizations wrote letters to 
the state government naming the unaccredited policemen and demanding that they were 
removed. Again, the state attorney general arrived in the city and performed another mass 




During the 1950s California experienced a moral panic over youth drug use. Politicians, 
journalists, and civil society representatives focused on the threat of drug trafficking over 
the border and drug use in Tijuana. During this moral panic, they built on and developed 
various narratives, including those that stressed Mexican corruption and the protection of 
certain frontier kingpins. They also advanced the strategy of using the temporary closure 
of the border to force the Mexican authorities into action. By the early 1960s, these views 
had reached Washington, D.C.. At the White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug 
                                                        
102 Noticias, 7 May 1957.  
103 Noticias, 30 Sept. 1956; Noticias, 23 Oct. 1956; Noticias, 24 Oct. 1956; Noticias, 25 Oct. 1956.  
104 Noticias, 20 Oct. 1957; Noticias, 23 Oct. 1957.  
105 Noticias, 7 Jun. 1959; Noticias, 21 Mar. 1958; Noticias, 14 June 1958. 
Abuse in September 1963, the Democrat Governor of California, Edmund Brown, urged 
“immediate action” to combat the border drug trade. Mexico, he claimed, was the 
“primary source for narcotics in our state”. Though such ideas crossed party lines, they 
were first introduced as national policy under President Nixon. As Vice-President Nixon 
had written to the Los Angeles Times to promise that the government would press for “a 
concerted effort on the part of the Mexican government officials.”106 Eight years later, he 
introduced the idea where he knew it would have resonance, in suburban Anaheim 
California.107 And in 1969 he fulfilled his promise by implementing Operation Intercept, 
a rigorous stop-and-search campaign, on the U.S. border. Like the early slowdowns, the 
operation was portrayed as a preventative strategy, designed to halt drug imports into the 
United States. Yet, just like these early, ad hoc closures, it actually functioned as a means 
of extortion. Disrupting trade pushed the Mexican government into action. As one FBI 
agent later expressed, “for diplomatic reasons the true purpose of the exercise was never 
revealed... it was an exercise in international extortion, pure, simple and effective, 
designed to bend Mexico to our will. We figured Mexico could hold out for a month, in 
fact they caved in after two weeks and we got what we wanted. Operation Intercept gave 
way to Operation Cooperation”.108  
 
California’s moral panic also had a profound effect over the border. The Baja California 
Norte government was forced to impose a series of counter-narcotics measures including 
periodic mass arrests, drug seizures, and the sacking of police officials. Yet, these 
measures were not simply reactions to exogenous U.S. pressure. They were also 
responses to endogenous demands from members of Mexican civil society to clean up 
local politics. To put it another way, Mexican drug policy was often determined by 
subnational politics. This occurred throughout the country where other waves of anti-drug 
policies were as dependent on regional political frameworks as federal mandates or U.S. 
coercion. In 1947 in Tamaulipas, in 1965 in Sinaloa, and in 1976 in Sonora intra-PRI 
factionalism broke down agreements between traffickers and political elites, triggered 
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accusations in the public sphere, and generated a series of counter-narcotics measures.109 
But it had the most profound effect on the border, where opposition politics interwove 
with and enforced U.S. moral panics. To the east at the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez frontier a 
similar process emerged. During the 1950s, citizen groups, linked to an emboldened 
PAN, utilized Texas scare stories about the border vice trade to attack the regional 
governor and lever him from power.110 Together such processes suggest that scholars of 
the international drug war should move beyond the study of diplomats and heads of state 
and towards frameworks, which view everyday drug policy as a product of the 
convergence of U.S. pressure, subnational politics, and civic activism.111 
 
Finally, such observations reinforce the connections between the domestic and the 
international aspects of the war on drugs. Rather than seeing them as separate issues (to 
be studied by separate disciplines), we should instead observe them as deeply 
intertwined. We should, in short, view the thousands of African Americans languishing in 
U.S. prisons and the thousands of dead and disappeared Mexicans as two sides of the 
same coin, victims of the same interlinking processes. In the most basic terms, the 
domestic and the international drug war share a similar chronology. Both conflicts 
experienced a radical intensification from the 1970s onwards.112 In the United States, 
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politicians turned towards mass incarceration, especially of African-Americans. Outside 
the country, these same politicians developed a policy of extortion to coerce foreign 
governments, like that of Mexico, to crack down on the trade. They share a similar 
narrative structure, which blames “outsiders” and “others” for white America’s 
problems.113 And they share an economic rationale, which seeks to distribute surpluses in 
financial capital, labor, and state capacity. On the domestic front, this has generated what 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore terms “the prison fix”.114 On the border, it has led to the growth of 
the Border Patrol and what commentators now term the security-industrial complex.115 
And in Mexico and other South American countries, it has led to the increased funding of 
the police, the military, and global arms companies.116 But, as this article argues, the 
domestic and the international war on drugs also share similar roots in 1950s moral 
panics. These shared a ground zero – the borderlands and particularly California.117 These 
set out the moral landscape of Mexican traffickers, black and brown pushers, and white 
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